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Abstract
Levinson (1995, 2000) and Traugott & Dasher (2002) suggest that semantic change
proceeds from particularized conversational implicature via generalized conver-
sational implicature to coded meaning. However, this model is ultimately neither
theoretically nor empirically tenable. Our alternative proposal builds on the as-
sumption that PCI are in the communicative foreground of a message while GCI
are in its background. The following sequences therefore seem to be possible:
1. A PCI semanticizes directly:
PCI (*→ GCI)→ coded meaning.
2. A PCI turns into a GCI, but is not fully semanticized:
PCI→ GCI (*→ coded meaning).
3. A GCI semanticizes, but only after being foregrounded as a PCI:
GCI→ PCI→ coded meaning.
1 Introduction
It has become familiar to assume that a salient subset of semantic changes can
be construed as the conventionalization of conversational implicatures. In recent
work, Traugott (1999); ? and Traugott & Dasher (2002) link this assumption to
Levinson’s (1995; 2000) theory of generalized conversational implicature, sug-
gesting that change proceeds from particularized conversational implicature (PCI,
utterance-token meaning) via generalized conversational implicature (GCI, utterance-
type meaning) to coded meaning (sentence meaning).
In this paper, we will show that this three-stage model of language change
does not stand up to closer scrutiny, either theoretically or empirically. Instead, we
will present an alternative proposal, which builds on the assumption that PCIs are
prototypically in the communicative foreground of messages, whereas GCIs are
prototypically backgrounded, and we will argue that, while GCIs do play a role
in language change, they do so in a much less simple way than is assumed in the
Levinson/Traugott & Dasher-model.
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2 The background
2.1 Grice’s theory of implicature
Besides so-called conventional implicatures (exemplified by but in (1)), which are
linguistically coded, but non-truth-conditional, aspects of meaning, Grice (1975)
distinguishes two types of conversational implicatures, namely particularized im-
plicatures (henceforth PCIs) vs generalized implicatures (henceforth GCIs). Both
types can be calculated using the cooperative principle, together with its attendant
maxims1, the principal difference between them being that PCIs require a specific
type of context in order to arise, whereas GCIs are so common that they rather
require a specific type of context in order to be canceled.
Thus, the implicature carried by B’s utterance in (2) is a PCI, given that an
utterance of My in-laws are coming to dinner does not prototypically convey
that “The speaker is unable to go out for a beer after work”. Rather, this impli-
cature depends on the particular context of utterance. The implicature carried by
the quantifier some in (3), on the other hand, is a GCI. It will be conveyed in the
overwhelming majority of contexts in which some is used, despite the fact that
some is logically compatible with the meaning “all”, as seen in (4), where the
following clause cancels the implicature without contradiction.
(1) John is brilliant, but lazy. (So perhaps we shouldn’t hire him.)
(2) A. Do you wanna go out for a beer after work?
B. My in-laws are coming to dinner. (→ The speaker is unable to go out for
a beer after work.)
(3) Some of my linguistics students are pretty bright. (→ Not all of the speak-
er’s linguistics students are pretty bright.)
(4) Some of my linguistics students are pretty bright; in fact, I’d say all of them
are.
2.2 Levinson’s theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature
Subsequently, Stephen Levinson (1995, 2000) has refined the notion of GCIs, ar-
guing that their existence forces us to rethink the semantics-pragmatics interface.
1These are the two Quantity maxims (“Say no more than is required”, “Say as
much as is required”), the Quality maxim (“Do not say anything which you
believe to be false, or for which you lack sufficient evidence”), the Relation
maxim (“Be relevant”), and the four Manner maxims (“Avoid obscurity”, “Avoid
ambiguity”, “Be brief”, “Be orderly”).
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He reformulates Grice’s quantity and manner maxims as three default heuristics,
as follows:
Q-heuristic: What is not said is not the case.
I-heuristic: What is simply described is stereotypically and
specifically instantiated.
M-heuristic: A marked description signals a marked state of affairs.
Levinson (2000: 74) does not include heuristic versions of Grice’s quality and rela-
tion maxims, as he considers quality to play mainly a background role in discourse
understanding, and relation (or relevance) as generating only PCIs.
The Q- and M-heuristics are complementary and metalinguistic in nature, and
they work by negative inference to what might have been said. The I-heuristic,
on the other hand, is based on encyclopedic knowledge, and works by positive
inference.
The scalar implicature conveyed by the use of some in (3) above is a typical
instance of a Q-implicature.<some, all> constitute a semantic scale of the general
form <weak item, strong item>, such that the former, weaker expression is logi-
cally compatible with the latter, stronger expression, while the applicability of the
stronger expression logically entails that of the weaker one (cf. Horn 1989: 210ff).
In other words, asserting the stronger quantifier is more informative, so if a speaker
nevertheless uses the weaker one, the hearer is normally entitled to infer that the
speaker cannot vouch for the truth of the stronger expression.
The implicature known as “conditional perfection”, on the other hand, illus-
trates the workings of the I-heuristic. The antecedent of (5) literally expresses only
a sufficient condition, leaving open whether or not other things might also induce
the speaker to let the hearer taste her ice cream; nevertheless, hearers will strongly
tend to interpret such an antecedent as conveying a more informative necessary
and sufficient condition, i.e. if and only if (cf. Geis & Zwicky 1971):
(5) If you let me taste your ice cream, you can taste mine.
A different type of I-implicature is that found in (6), where a drink is standardly
interpreted as referring to an alcoholic drink:
(6) I need a drink – right now!
Finally, a typical M-implicature is conveyed, for instance, by the double negation
of (7), where the speaker is likely to be understood as qualifying her assessment of
Max’s intelligence, as compared to the more straightforward (“unmarked”) (8):
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(7) Max is not unintelligent.
(8) Max is intelligent.
Clearly, potential implicatures may sometimes conflict, and to cope with such
cases, Levinson poses a hierarchy between the three heuristics, such that Q-im-
plicatures are computed first, canceling any incompatible M-implicature, which
in turn cancel potential, but incompatible I-implicatures (cf. Levinson 1995: 106;
?: 39).
Levinson provides a long (but non-exhaustive) list of expressions that are all
said to have this kind of “preferred interpretations”, and he concludes that the ex-
tent to which GCIs are found in ordinary language use is an indication that the tra-
ditional dichotomy between “sentence meaning” (corresponding to semantics) and
“utterance meaning” (corresponding to pragmatics) must be abolished in favor of a
trichotomy, where utterance meaning is divided into “utterance-type meaning” and
“utterance-token meaning”. Contrary to utterance-token meaning, which remains
purely pragmatic, utterance-type meaning depends only indirectly on the inten-
tions of speakers (via their cancelability), and to a much larger extent on general
expectations about how language is used. Thus, semantics and pragmatics inter-
digitate at this level, in as much as utterance-type meaning must sometimes be
computed before truth conditions can be attributed to the utterance token.
3 GCI theory and diachronic semantics
Levinson (1995: 95; 2000: 263) also puts forward the hypothesis – which he does
not develop further – that there exists a diachronic macro-sequence of semasiolog-
ical change, as follows:
(9) Utterance-token meaning (primarily PCIs) >
Utterance-type meaning (primarily GCIs) >
Sentence meaning (including, but not limited to, conventional
implicatures)
This latter hypothesis has been the focus of recent work by Elizabeth Traugott, who
– together with Richard B. Dasher – has developed a so-called Invited Inferencing
Theory of Semantic Change (IITSC) (Traugott & Dasher 2002). These authors
combine Levinson’s hypothesized macro-sequence with the notion of (inter-)sub-
jectification, to account for the semantic evolution of a salient subset of expression-
types, namely discourse markers, modal verbs, performative verbs and construc-
tions, and social deixis. They reformulate the sequence as (10) (where “invited in-
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ference” is basically another term for “conversational implicature”, although Trau-
gott & Dasher put more emphasis on the intersubjective negotiation of meanings
than Grice’s original model does):
(10) Particularized invited inference (IIN) > Generalized invited
inference (GIIN) > Coded meaning
The IITSC model is very inspiring, but it also raises a number of questions. In
this paper, we will be concerned only with the tenability of the above-mentioned
macro-sequence as a fundamental principle governing semasiological change. We
will attempt to show, on both empirical and theoretical grounds, that the hypoth-
esis of a diachronic macro-sequence of the type in (9)–(10) is not generally ten-
able, and that its applicability is, in fact, severely restricted. We emphasize that the
IITSC-model in its entirety is not vitiated by our argument: both the central idea
that implicature/invited inferencing is a prime motor in semantic change, and the
nine more specific macro-sequences identified by Traugott & Dasher (2002: 281)
remain intact even if the macro-sequence in (9)–(10) is rejected, as we believe it
must be.
3.1 Conceptual problems with the proposed macro-sequence
As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, we perceive a number of problems with
the proposed diachronic sequence, of both a conceptual and an empirical nature.
3.1.1 Potential mismatches in the level of application
Starting with the conceptual problems, it is worth pointing out that semasiological
change happens at the level of individual lexemes and constructions, whereas the
notions of utterance-type/token meaning, sentence-type meaning, and PCI/GCI all
refer to larger units of meaning. Hence, we may expect a less than perfect match
between levels. We return to this point in sect. 3.2.3. below.
3.1.2 Some PCIs cannot convert to GCIs, by definition
Secondly, we would not expect the sequence to be actually obligatory, in as much
as PCIs very frequently arise in response to Grice’s maxims of quality and/or rele-
vance (as seen in (2) above), whereas GCIs, as we have seen, are attributed exclu-
sively to (versions of) the maxims of quantity and manner. In other words, PCIs
and GCIs frequently differ not only with respect to their degree of conventional-
ization, but also with respect to their content. In order for a relevance PCI to go
through the sequence, we would expect it to convert into a relevance GCI before
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semanticizing. However, given that in Levinson’s theory there are no relevance and
quality GCIs, relevance and quality PCI simply cannot travel the sequence. On a
strict reading of the proposed sequence, we would hence expect relevance and
quality PCIs to be unable to semanticize, contrary to fact (cf. sect. 3.2.1. below).
3.1.3 Routine interpretations are relatively unlikely to lexicalize
Thirdly, GCIs are defined as very general strategies of interpretation, which are
not so much actively created by specific contexts, as they may be canceled by such
contexts. For this reason, GCIs should be relatively unlikely to semanticize. There
is no doubt that such semanticization does occur (examples will be given below),
but we would expect it, mutatis mutandis, to be less frequent in the case of GCIs,
which, by definition, will go through in the large majority of contexts anyway, than
in the case of PCIs, which will only arise in fairly specific contexts.
Indeed, Levinson (2000: 64ff) himself discusses the “square of oppositions” of
traditional logic (cf. Figure 1 below). The names of the corners “A”, “I”, “E”, and
“O” stand for the first viz. the second vowels of the words “affirmo” and “nego”,
respectively, and are intended as mnemonic of the place of the respective item
in the array of oppositions. Levinson takes up the cross-linguistic generalization
observed by Horn (1989: 252ff) that in many domains of oppositions, the “O”
corner is not lexicalized as the coded content of one lexical item. As coded content,
it can be expressed only compositionally by combination of two words, as Table 1
(below) suggests for English.
As Levinson argues, GCI theory offers an explanation for this. The “I” corner
carries a scalar implicature to the effect that “O” also holds. Some Q-implicates
“not all”, possible Q-implicates “possibly not”, and so on. That is, the “O” corner
is unlike the other three in that it is routinely implicated by another corner (the
“I”). Consequently, Levinson (2000: 70) puts forward a “redundancy constraint on
lexicalization”:
For any lexical item W that carries a generalized Quantity
implicature P, there will be no fully lexicalized counterpart W’ that
lexicalizes the content of P. Because I items on a Square will always
implicate O items, there will be no lexicalized O items.
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I O
A Econtrary
contradictories
subcontrary
(All N are P) (No N is P)
(Some N is P) (Not all N are P)
Figure 1
Domain Affirmo nEgo affIrmo negO
Quantifiers All None Some Not all/*Nall
Logical
modals
Necessary Impossible Possible Possible
not/*Innecessary2
Deontic
modals
Must Must
not/Mustn’t
May (= permit) May not (= permit
not)/*Mayn’t
Logical
connectives
And Neither. . . nor or Not both/*Nand
Table 1
This redundancy constraint works against the proposed sequence, at least as re-
gards Q-implicatures: if an interpretation obtains as the result of a GCI anyway,
then it is unlikely to become coded as part of langue, whether by actual word for-
mation, or by semantic change. It is simply not necessary to have a coded meaning
for that interpretation. In other words, rather than promote semantic change, the
Q-principle would tend to retard it.
2Clearly, unnecessary exists as a lexical item, but crucially, this word is not used
in the purely logical sense alluded to here, and so is not an alternative to possible
. . . not.
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3.1.4 The proposed sequence does not exhibit a cline of conventionalization
Finally, one may legitimately question whether the proposed sequence does, in
fact, exhibit a cline of conventionalization, even in the abstract. It seems to us that,
with respect to language, the word “conventional” is used in two very different
senses: on the one hand, it is used in a technical sense, as a near-synonym of
‘arbitrary’, ‘unmotivated’, or ‘uncalculable’; while on the other hand, it is also
often used in a more colloquial sense, to mean something closer to ‘unmarked’
or ‘common’ (this distinction corresponds roughly to Morgan’s [1978] distinction
between “conventions of language” and “conventions of usage”).
In order for PCIs, GCIs, and coded content to form a semanticization cline, the
former, “technical” interpretation of “conventional” as ‘arbitrary’ is needed. On
this interpretation however, a GCI may be less conventional than a PCI, as becomes
clear from Nunberg’s (1978: 116) model (based on Lewis 1969) of the degree of
conventionalization that can be attributed – on purely conceptual grounds, inde-
pendently of diachronic development – to any given form-meaning pair. Nunberg
distinguishes the following six stages of conventionalization:
A given use R of an expression is non-conventional (i.e. fully rational and
motivated) for a given speaker S in:
Stage 1: S believes that it is normally believed in the speech community that,
given another regular use R’ of the same word, R is licensed by normal beliefs.
This would apply, for instance, to the use of the word chicken to refer to chicken
meat. Such uses are “normal”, and appear rational even out of context.
Stage 2: S believes that it is normally believed that, given R’, R is licensed by
beliefs to which some members of the community would normally conform. This
would be the case, for instance, of a waitress using ham sandwich to refer to a
customer having ordered a ham sandwich. Such uses are only rational in context.
R becomes progressively more conventionalized in:
Stage 3: S believes that it is normally believed that, given R’, R is licensed by
beliefs that may be accounted normal by some members of the community, but to
which members of the community would not normally conform (e.g. the use of
nylons to refer to stockings).
Stage 4: S believes that it is normally believed that, given R’, the beliefs that
license R are not conformed to by any members of the community, though these
beliefs may still be normally accessible (e.g. the use of the expression to make
book to mean ‘to place a bet’).
Stage 5: S believes that it is normally believed that, given R’, there exist beliefs
such that R would be licensed by them (e.g. to kick the bucket meaning ‘to die’).
Idioms, according to Nunberg, are found in stages 3–5.
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Stage 6: S believes that it is normally believed that there is no regularity R’ such
that the use of the word to mean R could be predicted (e.g. bear market meaning
‘stock market with falling prices’). This stage represents pure convention.
Now, it seems to us that, according to Nunberg’s definitions, PCIs must be
found in stage 2. However, although some implicatures (prominently, M-impli-
catures involving word formation or contrasts such as beverage vs drink)3 may
be at home in stages 2 or 3, a significant number of GCIs, particularly Q- and
I-implicatures, seem to belong in stage 1. In other words, such GCIs are less con-
ventional (in the ‘arbitrary, non-rational’ sense that we need when talking about
degrees of semanticization) than PCIs, both types of implicatures being less con-
ventional than coded meaning.
Turning to the second, colloquial, interpretation of “conventional” as ‘com-
mon’, ‘unmarked’, it seems that it is only on this interpretation that one is actually
justified in seeing GCIs as invariably more conventional than PCIs. Given that a
GCI applies routinely, it is in the perceptual background of the message. A PCI,
however, is in its perceptual foreground, given that it requires special, context-
dependent circumstances. Therefore, a GCI will, all other things being equal, rep-
resent a more common, unmarked, interpretation as compared to a PCI, thereby
complying with the sequence.
However, a GCI interpretation is also typically a more common and more un-
marked interpretation of some item than its coded meaning interpretation, given
that the GCI interpretation is by definition its routine interpretation, whereas the
coded meaning interpretation requires the suspension of this routine. According to
this sense of “conventional”, a GCI is hence more conventional than coded mean-
ing, thereby invalidating the sequence.
Summarizing this point, the first reading of “conventional” as “arbitrary” will,
in some cases, yield the following ordering of the three interpretation-types, where
“<” means “less conventional than”:
(11) GCI < PCI < coded meaning
– and in other cases:
(12) PCI < GCI < coded meaning
3In sect. 4.4.2. below, we will problematize the status of so-called M-GCIs,
suggesting that a great many (perhaps all) of these are, in fact, either coded
meanings or PCIs.
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On the second interpretation of “conventional” as “common, unmarked” the or-
der may look like this (not committing ourselves to a claim as to the respective
ordering of PCI and coded meaning):
(13) {PCI; coded meaning} < GCI
3.2 Descriptive problems with the proposed macro-sequence
At the empirical level, the PCI > GCI > coded meaning sequence presents both
general and very specific problems, as well.
3.2.1 Lack of referential overlap excludes GCI stage
Starting with our more general objections, it is widely recognized that the two ma-
jor (although not the only) mechanisms of semasiological change are metaphor and
metonymy lato sensu. Traugott & Dasher (2002: 29ff) strongly defend metonymy
as the more important mechanism. While we agree with this assessment in prin-
ciple, it is nevertheless undeniably the case that a significant number of changes
remain metaphorically based. Now, metaphor crucially relies on a qualitative leap
from one conceptual domain to another (from a “source” domain to a “target” do-
main), and is based on factual incompatibility between these two domains, such
that a given lexeme or construction must be understood either literally or figura-
tively (cf. Blank 1997: 161).
Take, for instance, the English lexeme mouse and its equivalents in a number of
European languages: originally, the nouns in question denote a particular kind of
small rodent, but over the past couple of decades, they have added a second sense,
namely ‘a computer-device roughly of the size and shape of a small rodent’. We
may plausibly assume that the new polysemy was initially understood by hearers
as a quality- and relevance-based PCI.4 It seems, however, inconceivable that there
4Several people have remarked that the mouse example seems like a planned
change to them. Hence, they do not see it as a matter of implicature. Personally,
we think it not at all unlikely that the metaphor originally arose in conversation
between computer technicians, and was subsequently adopted as the official name
for the device in question. Be that as it may, non-experts who heard this term for
the first time must have interpreted it metaphorically in order to understand the
justification for it (at least, we did. . . ). Generally speaking, any arbitrarily chosen
instance of a metaphorical change – even when there is absolutely no reason to
think of it as having been planned –, must have gone directly from PCI > coded
meaning, in the way we describe (e.g. the change in Latin musculus, from ‘little
mouse’ > ‘muscle’).
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should ever have been a GCI-stage, given that literal reference to “small rodents”
cannot routinely and simultaneously implicate reference to computer-devices, as
the definition of GCI would require. Furthermore, in the light of the objections
above, it is not clear at all what kind of GCI could have come between the PCI
stage and the coded meaning stage, given that there are, as noted above, no quality-
and relevance-based GCIs in Levinson’s system. The new meaning must therefore
have been semanticized directly, giving us the following diachronic sequence:
(14) PCI (*→ GCI)→ coded meaning
The same reasoning applies to a series of metonymies. In his taxonomy of met-
onymic changes, Koch (2001) shows that in a salient subset of metonymies there
is no referential overlap, either. For example, when the source meaning of Engl.
tongue, ‘organ located in the mouth’, is metonymically extended to ‘language’,
there is no overlap of reference between the two denotata, so reference to the
former cannot involve a GCI of reference to the latter.
Conversely, we find cases of semantic change where it seems most plausible
to assume that there was no initial PCI stage, but that the new meaning was born a
GCI and subsequently became semanticized. This appears to be true of what Geer-
aerts (1997: 68ff), following Dik (1977), refers to as “inductive generalizations”,
an instance of which would be the English verb to crawl, whose basic meaning is
“to move on hands and knees”, as in (15), but which has added the sense “to move
slowly”, as in (16). Encyclopedic knowledge tells us that, all things being equal,
a person who is moving on hands and knees is likely to be moving slowly, but, as
evidenced by (17), this is a defeasible inference:
(15) We crawled through the tunnel.
(16) The car was crawling along the curb.
(17) That baby crawls really fast!
In other words, we have, in the case of crawl a sequence of the following kind:
(18) (*PCI→) GCI→ coded meaning
Given that Traugott & Dasher (2002), at least (if not Levinson), restrict their di-
achronic claims to a subset of semantics domains, and that their model is therefore
not automatically falsified by the above observations, it behooves us to examine
their own examples more closely, to see whether they, at least, might actually at-
test to the existence of a PCI > GCI > coded meaning sequence. It is not clear
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that they do, and, indeed, the authors tend to leave this particular sequence out of
consideration, and to focus exclusively on other, more specific sequences, when
analyzing instances of semantic change.
3.2.2 Is proof of the allegedly intermediate GCI stage ever offered at all?
For instance, in their chapter on the development of English modal verbs, Traugott
& Dasher (2002: 120ff) analyze English must. They state that the first step in its
semantic development towards present-day uses took place when the source verb,
OE mot-, which originally conveyed a meaning of deontic permission, changed
to convey deontic obligation instead, and they argue that ambiguity of mot- in
the context of negation was most likely a contributing factor, cf. (19). However,
this particular change exhibits a less-than-optimal fit with our macro-sequence,
given the logical equivalence in (20), which precludes cancelation of the putative
“implicature”:
(19) Hit is halig restendœg; ne most ðu styrigan Þine beddinge
(c. 1000 ÆCHom II, 42 – cited in Traugott & Dasher 2002: 124)
‘It is a holy day of rest; you may not/must not move your bed’
(20) ~may (do X) ≡ must ~(do X)
In positive contexts, it is certainly possible that utterances like (21), in which an
unwelcome permission is expressed, may be understood as implicating obligation.
However, this is highly unlikely to ever have been a GCI, but must be either a PCI
or (later) a coded meaning. In other words, while both PCIs and GCIs may have
been involved at this stage of the evolution of must, they probably appeared in very
different contexts, and thus could not have formed a sequence.
(21) we moton eow secgan eowre sawle Þearfe, licige eow ne licige eow (c. 1000
ÆCHom I, 17 (App) 182.240 – cited in Traugott & Dasher 2002: 124)
‘we may/must tell you of your soul’s needs, whether you like it or not’
The next step in the evolution is taken when the meaning of must is extended from
deontic obligation to epistemic necessity. Here, contexts like (22) are claimed to
carry implicatures of epistemicity. If this is a GCI, it would, as far as we can
tell, have to be an I-implicature. The problem here is that the deontic interpre-
tation is actually more informative than the epistemic one, according to Levinson
(1995: 101; 2000: 115), who defines increased informativity as increased speci-
ficity. Even if one chooses a broader definition of informativity, it is problematic
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to assume that the epistemic interpretation strengthens informativity, in as much as
the explicit marking of epistemic necessity actually weakens the degree to which
the speaker adheres to the truth of the proposition, as compared with the unmodal-
ized proposition, cf. (23)–(24). Moreover, the deontic and the epistemic reading
are incompatible in a great many (if not most) contexts (cf. (25)–(26)). The epis-
temic interpretation could therefore not plausibly be a GCI of the deontic one, be-
cause the latter would then only be available in a restricted number of non-default
contexts:
(22) ho-so hath with him godes grace: is dede mot nede beo guod (c. 1450 Life
of St Edmund, p. 440 – cited in Traugott & Dasher 2002: 128)
‘whoever has God’s grace must necessarily be good’
(23) It’s six o’clock. Peter is back from work.
(24) It’s six o’clock. Peter must be back from work.
(25) [The department needs to hire a new linguist.] S/he must be a good syntac-
tician.→ deontic interpretation: future/intensional.
(26) [Joan had a paper accepted by NLLT.] She must be a good syntactician.→
epistemic interpretation: present/extensional.
A couple of additional examples from some other semantic domains covered by
Traugott & Dasher’s model will suffice to support our point. Traugott (2004b) an-
alyzes the evolution of the English connective after all, but does not show that the
non-literal extensions of the expression actually go through at stage where they
have GCI status before becoming fully conventionalized. She shows very con-
vincingly how new nuances of meaning, such as adversativity or justification arise
metonymically in so-called “harmonic” contexts like (27)–(28). However, in all
instances where an innovative meaning occurs in the absence of harmonic expres-
sions in the immediate co-text, she analyzes the new meaning as already conven-
tionalized. But if harmonic expressions are required for a given implicature to go
through, that implicature can hardly be a default interpretation of the expression to
which it seems to attach itself.
(27) Not that I want a due respect to other men’s opinions; but, after all, the
greatest reverence is due to truth. (1690 Locke, Essay concerning human
understanding, bk. 1, ch. 4, sct. 23 – cited in Traugott 2004b: 558)
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(28) You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explain-
ing things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man.
(1713 Berkeley, Dialogue, 2, p. 210 – cited in Traugott 2004b: 559)
Finally, Traugott & Dasher (2002: 252ff) analyze the grammaticalization of the
English verb pray as an adverb carrying social-deictic meaning. There is good
reason to believe that the adverbial use originated in the expression I pray you,
which, according to the authors, conveys a PCI of deference to the addressee. It is
this nuance of deference which is claimed to have been semanticized in the adverb
pray. For one thing, we lack a GCI stage in this analysis. Secondly, deference to
the addressee does not strike us as a plausible PCI of the performative expression:
rather, it would seem to be a felicity condition on the sincere utterance of that
performative, in which case deference is a coded element of meaning from the
very start. In other words, the evolution of pray from performative verb to adverb
does not so much involve the conventionalization of an implicature, as it involves
bleaching of the truth-conditional content of the verb, with concomitant syntactic
decategorialization:
(29) Comly kyng of mankyn, I pray the here my stevyn. (after 1460 Wakefield
Plays, p. 16 – cited in Traugott & Dasher 2002: 253)
‘Noble King of mankind, I pray thee hear my voice.’
(30) Pray, Sir Thomas, will you be pleased to give the court an Account, whether
you saw Mr. Ireland in Staffordshire 1678, and what time it was? (1685
Oates, p. 85 – cited in Traugott & Dasher 2002: 254)
3.2.3 Alternative interpretations of the proposed macro-sequence
Our impression is that, in formulating their model of semantic change, Levinson
(1995, 2000) as well as Traugott & Dasher (2002) redefine the notion of GCIs.
From being a purely pragmatic phenomenon, GCIs, as understood in connection
with the macro-sequence under review, become something more akin to the phe-
nomena of either propagation or actualization of specific linguistic changes.
From a sociolinguistic point of view, we may roughly distinguish three stages
in the history of any given semantic change (cf. Coseriu 1957; Weinreich et al.
1968; Croft 2000):
1) Innovation: a new use of a given lexeme or construction arises in a specific
context.
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2) Propagation: the new use gradually spreads to new users throughout the
speech community.
3) Normativity: the new use is commonly accepted as part of the linguistic
system.
Among these three stages, innovation is, of course, found at the level of utterance
tokens, which, as noted above, is where PCIs are prominently found. Once we
reach the normativity stage, we will in many cases be dealing with coded mean-
ings, which are located at the level of sentence types. The propagation stage, on
the other hand, does not correspond to the level where GCIs are found, namely
Levinson’s level of utterance types. Being concerned with norms of discourse (as
opposed to strictly linguistic norms), utterance types belong, rather, at the norma-
tivity stage, just as, of course, coded meaning does. At the propagation stage, an
on-going change will constitute an innovation for some language users, while for
others, it will already be normative or near-normative. It is quite possible that this
constitutes the potential mismatch that we mentioned earlier. For example, Trau-
gott & Dasher (2002: 35) propose that
[. . .] SP/W [speakers / writers, MBMH/RW] may begin ad hoc to
exploit a conversational implicature (IIN) that already exists and may
even use it innovatively in a new linguistic environment. Such uses
may be considered personal features of style and are unlikely to
survive and play any part in a particular change unless they come to
be endowed with symbolic value. If they do acquire social value and
therefore become salient in a community they are likely to spread to
other linguistic contexts and to other SP/Ws, they become GIINs
with strengthened pragmatic impact.
This very formulation seems to suggest that the GCI stage simply equals propaga-
tion. The parallel is even explicitly suggested in a footnote on the same page.
Eckardt (2003), who embraces the Traugott-Dasher model, likewise explicitly
identifies the “intermediate” stage with the sociolinguistic process of propagation:
The only uncertainty s/he [i.e. the speaker, MBMH/RW] experiences
is of a sociological nature: Do other speakers actually possess and
use this new entry, or not? While the speaker may be gradually more
and more convinced that the new item is indeed part of the common
language, they do not, according to this picture, gradually develop
the meaning and grammar of the new entry. (Eckardt 2003: 49)
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Alternatively, it may be that GCIs in Levinson’s/Traugott & Dasher’s model are
conflated with the phenomenon of actualization. From the point of view of the
linguistic system, we may distinguish two stages in a diachronic change:
1) Reanalysis: a given lexeme or construction is reanalyzed semantically (and
possibly also syntactically and/or morphologically), yielding a new sense
(cf. Detges & Waltereit 2002; Eckardt 2003).
2) Actualization: use of the new sense gradually spreads to more and more
contexts, as language users become aware of the full range of applicabil-
ity consistent with the meaning in question. Typically, actualization starts
in “unmarked” contexts, subsequently spreading to more marked ones (cf.
Timberlake 1977; Harris & Campbell 1995: 81f).
It is not impossible that what Levinson or Traugott & Dasher consider to be GCIs
in the context of diachronic change might more correctly be seen as actualizations
of reanalyzed structures which are still in the “unmarked” phase.
Be that as it may, it is conceivable that any reinterpretation that may have taken
place with respect to the notion of GCI could be due to an unclarity as to the central
definitional property of GCI, as opposed to PCI, to which we now turn.
3.2.4 Are PCI and GCI discrete notions, or is there a continuum?
In the literature, PCI and GCI are canonically treated as discrete notions. Recently,
however, some scholars (e.g. Carston 2002: 111) have suggested that there may
rather be a continuum between the two, given that the very distinction of “partic-
ularized” vs “generalized” makes use of gradual terms. Furthermore, the distin-
guishing criterion of “applying in a specific context” vs “applying in the majority
of contexts” seems to be inherently gradual. It makes reference to frequency, which
is by definition a gradual notion.
We prefer to adhere to the traditional conception. The idea of a continuum be-
tween PCI and GCI strikes us as problematic if we consider items with low overall
token frequency. Take reference-writing, a well-known jungle of implicatures. For
example, the utterance NN is nice to other people, and he always shows up for
meetings on time is normally understood, in that context, to convey that NN is not
at all brilliant at what he does, and hence as a negative evaluation. This interpre-
tation is so famously associated with the sentence that it is probably its routine
interpretation, given the low overall frequency of the construction. Is it a GCI
then? According to the basically frequency-based criterion of GCI status, the an-
swer should be yes, since in most of its actual uses that interpretation will certainly
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be the intended one. However, one could as well argue that we are dealing with a
PCI, on the grounds that it is the specific context of use, namely reference-writing,
with its established norm of writing nothing manifestly negative about the person
in question, that guides the listener to the intended interpretation.
The problem, then, is that some utterance-types routinely have a specific non-
conventional interpretation but only occur in very specific contexts anyway. What
this points to is that the customary distinction between PCI and GCI makes ref-
erence to two orthogonal criteria: the frequency with which an utterance type is
matched with a specific non-coded interpretation on the one hand, and the de-
gree of context-dependency of such an interpretation on the other hand. Most of
the time, a highly context-dependent interpretation will indeed not be the most
frequent non-literal interpretation of the utterance, so that there is no danger of
obfuscation. But, as the reference-writing example shows, the most frequent non-
literal interpretation may also occur only in a specific context. This in turn argues
against the existence of a continuum from PCI to GCI, since “particularized” vs
“generalized” in fact do not belong to one scale of “generality”, but to two differ-
ent criteria. While these two criteria usually seem to converge, that is apparently
not always the case. This means that there is ultimately no very good reason to
assume that there should be a diachronic default sequence from one to the other
kind of implicature at all.
We shall see in the immediately following section that the apparently sole case
where a PCI does turn into a GCI diachronically, in compliance with the Levin-
son/Traugott & Dasher model, is the conventionalization of indirectness. But, even
in this case, a given particularized implicature does not simply increase in “gener-
ality”. Rather, with the conventionalization of indirectness, a Relevance PCI con-
verts into a Quantity (I-)GCI. This in turn suggests that the conventionalization of
indirectness is not a linear, monotonous process, but that there is a “leap”. This,
again, might suggest that there is no immediate continuum from PCI to GCI.
4 An alternative proposal
We will now propose an alternative, more nuanced, view of how and to what extent,
GCIs fit into a theory of semasiological change. It seems to us that the interaction
between PCIs, GCIs and coded meaning is, in fact, a good deal less simple than
the Levinson/Traugott & Dasher model would suggest. This does not mean that
changes never happen along the lines suggested by that model. But such changes
are, as we will try to show, very rare exceptions.
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4.1 Partial instantiations of the sequence PCI > GCI > coded meaning
For instance, we find it fairly straightforward to assume that so-called conven-
tionally indirect speech acts, as in (31), have the status of GCIs. Presumably, the
request interpretation of the could you do X? construction found in (31) first arose
as a relevance-PCI. Two things should be noted in this connection, however: First
of all, as pointed out above, there is no such thing as a relevance-GCI, according
to Levinson. If anything, the could you do X? construction must currently carry an
I-implicature. As already mentioned, this raises the question of how exactly con-
version from dependence on relevance to dependence on the I-heuristic might take
place.
In fact, the inferencing work assigned to the listener is of completely different
order with could you do X? as a non-conventionalized and a conventionalized form
of indirectness, respectively. In its diachronic infancy, could you do X? forced
the listener to relate the utterance to contextual assumptions about what might
be meant by could. However, when the utterance instantiates a conventionalized
form of indirectness, then the listener will simply have to activate the stereotypical
interpretation of the utterance-type5.
Secondly, although conventionally indirect speech acts of this kind may, never-
theless, plausibly have traveled the sequence from PCI to GCI, it is not at all clear
that they have completed the journey to coded meaning. Indeed, the experiments
reported in Clark & Schunk (1980) and Gibbs (1986) demonstrate that language
users are quite sensitive to the different “literal” meanings of conventionally in-
direct speech acts, and that the indirect meanings cannot, therefore, be fully se-
manticized, as is, of course, also evidenced by the fact that they are cancelable (cf.
(32)).
(31) Could you open the window? (→ Please open the window)
(32) Could you open the window if you had a crow bar?
A potential example of a formula that may have traveled the full sequence is the
greeting in (33), whose indirect speech act meaning cannot, as far as we can tell, be
canceled, i.e. it cannot be interpreted as even a ritual question, but only as a greet-
ing. However, note that on a “literal” reading, the formula in question, with the
5This argument might be considered as going against the assumption that
I-GCIs are not metalinguistic in nature. However, if we adopt Morgan’s (1978)
view that conventionalized indirectness is a convention of usage and not a
convention of the language itself, then it is clear that we are not dealing with
metalinguistic inferencing in the same sense as with Q- and M-GCIs.
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intransitive main verb do in the simple present tense accompanied only by a man-
ner adverbial (as opposed to a direct object), appears syntactically highly marked
in contemporary English, and that, if do is put in the present progressive instead, as
in (34), the “literal” question reading becomes felicitous again, suggesting that the
pure-greeting interpretation of this alternative construction remains a mere GCI6.
(33) A. How do you do? B. How do you do?/#Fine, thanks.
(34) A. How are you doing? B. How are you doing?/Fine, thanks.
We do not know the details of the history of how do you do?, but it seems a rea-
sonable conjecture that the formula was probably only semanticized because its
literal reading had otherwise become ungrammatical due to an independent syntac-
tic change in English, viz. the rise of the present progressive, which did not become
fully entrenched until the end of the 18th century (cf. Rissanen 1999: 216)7. This
appears all the more plausible as a major reason why speakers would want to use
indirect “question” greetings as an alternative to a simple hello! in the first place
is a concern to demonstrate a greater degree of positive politeness towards the ad-
dressee (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987). That is, this type of construction allows
speakers to show not only that they are aware of the addressee’s presence, but also
that they are at least nominally interested in his or her well-being. This function is,
however, completely lost the moment such a formula is semanticized and can no
6Notice also the difference in acceptability between the following two dialogues:
(i) A. I saw Max yesterday. B. Oh, how’s he doing?
vs
(ii) A. I saw Max yesterday. B. ?*Oh, how does he do?.
7A similar kind of reasoning might apply to the French request formula s’il vous
plaît ‘please’, literally ‘if it pleases you’. A literal understanding of the formula
as a conditional protasis seems impossible today, given that the il can literally be
understood only as an expletive subject followed by a “real” subject phrase. In
most cases, requests containing s’il vous plaît such as Vous pourriez ouvrir la
fenêtre, s’il vous plaît ? ‘Could you open the window, please?’ do not have the
subject phrase necessary for a literal understanding of the request formula. That
is, the request reading has travelled from PCI via GCI to semanticization.
Crucially, however, it could lexicalize only because the literal reading would
otherwise be ungrammatical.
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longer be understood literally. For that reason, conventionally indirect speech acts
should actually – all things being equal – resist semanticization. We will return to
this issue in 4.5.
4.2 GCI > PCI > coded meaning
We already saw, with the crawl examples, that a GCI may occasionally convert
into coded meaning, but we also noted that there was – at least in that particular
case – no obvious preceding PCI stage. In other words, although we seem, on the
face of it, to have evidence for each of the two successive paths of evolution, viz.
PCI > GCI and GCI > coded meaning, taken separately, we have yet to find an
unproblematic example of the full sequence.
What is more, the crawl example of the sequence GCI > coded meaning is
not, upon closer scrutiny, as straightforward as it seems. Consider how hearers
must have interpreted the very first uses of the verb crawl in utterances like (16)
above: clearly, if one is familiar only with uses of the type in (15) or (17), in which
crawl means “to move on hands and knees”, the use in (16) will appear remarkable.
Given that cars have neither hands nor knees, (16) will, on the original meaning of
crawl, obviously flout Grice’s quality maxim. This means that, in order to see the
relevance of such an utterance, hearers must interpret the speaker as intending a
PCI to the effect that the car was moving particularly slowly. We hypothesize that
this is fairly generally the case.
In other words, our main contention is that, due to their essentially back-
grounded nature, GCIs as such will not normally semanticize. For semanticization
to happen, the meaning in question must, as a rule, be foregrounded as a PCI of
one or more innovating contexts.
This is supported, for instance, by Eckardt’s (2003: ch. 6) account of the change
in German selbst, from intensifier (cf. (35)) to focus particle (cf. (36)).
(35) Der König selbst öffnete die Tür.
‘The King himself opened the door.’
(36) Selbst der König verstand den Witz.
‘Even the King understood the joke.’ (both from Eckardt 2003: 163)
The older, intensifying, use of selbst may frequently convey a focus-particle-like
notion of additivity, namely when marking that a central exemplar of a given do-
main “him-/her-/itself” took part in some process, because addressees may then
infer that other, lesser exemplars did so as well, cf. (37). As (35) shows, this in-
ference is, however, cancelable (in as much as one would not normally suppose
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that the same door was opened repeatedly by a number of different people, the
king being the most important), and it might be classified as a GCI of this type of
construction.
(37) Auff diese weise sind die Römer mit den Griechen / vnd die newen scriben-
ten mit den alten verfahren: so das sich Virgilius selber nicht geschämet /
gantze plätze auß andern zue entlehnen. . . (M. Opitz, Deutsche Poeterey,
ch. 8, 1624 – cited in Eckardt 2003: 169)
‘In this way, the Romans dealt with the Greeks / and the new scribes with
the old ones: such that Virgil himself was not ashamed to borrow entire
passages from others. . . ’
Importantly, however, Eckardt’s examples of the crucial onset contexts for this
change strongly suggest that the focus particle was lexicalized only due to a fore-
grounding of the additive inference as a PCI, in as much as there is, in these ex-
amples, no independently conceptualized core-periphery structure of which the
selbst-marked noun can be seen as a central instance. Such a structure can, at
best, be inferred by the addressee “on the spot”, a fact which may be assumed to
have been highly instrumental in prompting reanalysis of the meaning contribution
made by selbst to the utterance, cf. (38):
(38) Welch Jammer war nun da? Man sah’ auff allen Gassen / In höchster Ein-
samkeit die Häuser gantz verlassen: / Der Vatter ließ sein Kind / das Kind
den Vatter stehn / Vnd dorffte sicherlich kein Mensch zusammen gehn./ Die
Vögel machten selbst sich in die ferren Wüsten / Vnd wolten auß Gefahr
nunmehr bey vns nicht nisten. (M. Opitz, 1624 – cited in Eckardt 2003: 170)
‘What misery was now there? One saw on all the streets / in the highest
loneliness the houses entirely deserted: The father left the child, the child
left the father standing / and certainly no men might go together. / [The
birds themselves/Even the birds] left for the far deserts / and did no longer
want to nest with us, out of danger.’
In sum, it is our contention that an element of meaning which has GCI status in
other contexts, may suddenly be foregrounded as a PCI of a new type of context,
and be lexicalized from there, rather than directly from the GCI.
Another, different, factor should be taken into account, which speaks against
the semanticization of GCIs as such: namely the fact that the type of meanings that
prototypically have GCI status tend (as already suggested above, in connection
with indirect greetings) to be interactionally useful precisely because of their in-
ferential – as opposed to explicit – nature. Rather than increase the usage potential
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of the lexemes and constructions conveying GCI, semanticization will frequently
diminish it, and will therefore tend to be resisted and/or short-lived. We will come
back to this in sect. 4.5.
4.3 PCI status as a pre-requisite for lexicalization
Following up on the above analyses of crawl and selbst, we believe that the defini-
tion of PCIs and GCIs, respectively, points to an important difference in cognitive
status between the two types of implicatures, which has not been sufficiently ap-
preciated in diachronic semantics/pragmatics: Crucially, PCIs have to be actively
intended by speakers, and will only arise in very specific contexts, where they will
tend to constitute communicatively central messages. Thus, PCIs are foregrounded
elements of the meanings communicated by speakers. GCIs, on the other hand, al-
though they should not be actively unintended by speakers who do not take the
trouble to cancel them, do not have to be actively intended, either, and they will go
through by default in the large majority of contexts. This makes them prototypi-
cally backgrounded elements of meaning.
Consider a typical utterance of (3) above: it seems to us that, without focal
stress on some, the evaluatively negative Q-implicature (viz., that not all of the
students in question are bright) will not normally constitute the main point of the
utterance. The speaker is much more likely to want to convey the evaluatively
positive “literal” message that there is an unspecified number e 2 of good students
in his/her class. Similarly, a speaker who utters (39) is, despite the generality-
narrowing I-implicature that it presumably conveys in the majority of contexts (cf.
Levinson 2000: 37), unlikely to be very actively concerned with the gender of the
nurse in question, but is more likely to focus on the fact that his/her problem has
been tended to:
(39) The nurse bandaged my wound (→ The female nurse bandaged my wound)
Further evidence of this difference in cognitive status is provided by the differ-
ential possibilities of linking directly to the two different types of implicatures
in discourse. Thus, it would be perfectly felicitous for speaker A to continue the
exchange in (2) above as in (40). Crucially, A’s reply would not usually be inter-
preted to mean “Too bad your in-laws are coming to dinner!”, in which case A’s
reply would be linked to the “literal” meaning of B’s utterance, but would rather be
understood to convey “Too bad you can’t go out for a beer!”, and hence as being
linked to the PCI that is attached to the utterance. It appears very difficult, how-
ever, to link a reply directly to the “some-but-not-all” GCI conveyed by (3) above,
as the oddity of the exchange in (41) shows:
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(40) A. Do you wanna go out for a beer after work?
B. My in-laws are coming to dinner. (→ The speaker is unable to go out for
a beer after work.)
A. Oh, too bad! (= Too bad you can’t go out for a beer!)
(41) A. Some of my linguistics students are pretty bright. (→ Not all of the
speaker’s linguistics students are pretty bright.)
B. #Oh, too bad! (= Too bad not all of the students are bright!)8
Getting back to the process of semanticization, speakers who wish to take advan-
tage of a background GCI and make it into the primary meaning of a lexeme or
construction, while ignoring the “literal” meaning of the latter, have to foreground
that GCI. This requires a quality flout, and an attendant PCI. Such a PCI will be of
an essentially metalinguistic nature, serving as a signpost to the GCI normally as-
sociated with the lexeme or construction in question. In other words, to the extent
that the two types of implicatures form a sequence on the way to semanticization,
we do not actually have the sequence in (42), proposed by Levinson (1995, 2000))
and by Traugott & Dasher (2002), as the normal case, but rather the one in (43):
(42) PCI > GCI > coded meaning
8Salvador Pons Bordería (p.c.) has suggested that the exchange in (i) may be a
counterexample to our generalization, in as much as B is linking her answer
directly to a putative GCI associated with indefinite NPs, to the effect that the
possessive determiner does not apply. In other words, a woman→ “not the
subject’s wife”:
(i) I saw John at Maxim’s last night with a woman.
B. Is he crazy? His wife will divorce him!
How generalized this implicature really is, is debatable however: from an
utterance like I saw Maxine at the movies with a student last night, one will, it
seems to us, tend to infer that the student in question was one of Maxine’s own.
Moreover, the exchange in (i) appears felicitous only if both interactants know
that A knows, not only that John is married, but also what his wife looks like. (If
there is no reason think that A knows this, then there is a fortiori no reason to
attribute to him/her any opinion on whether or not the woman in question was
John’s wife.) It seems more likely, then, that we are dealing with a PCI in this
case.
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(43) GCI > PCI > coded meaning
The process sketched is entirely in line with the Gestalt theory of metonymic
change developed by Koch (2001, 2004) and Waltereit (2002).
According to Koch’s (2001; 2004) theory of metonymy, a metonymic change
is a figure / ground-shift within a frame. For instance, the French noun vitesse has
acquired, apart from its original sense “speed”, an additional meaning “gear”. Now,
Koch (2004: 8) argues that “gear” was already a backgrounded element of “speed”,
given that motor vehicles typically change their current speed when shifting gears,
and that this is part of speakers’ knowledge. This means that in a salient subset of
instances of use of vitesse in its original sense, the concept of “gear” or “shifting
gears” may play a role or may be evoked in the context. In this sense, “gear” is
in the background of “speed”. So, the semantic change consists in moving “gear”,
already present in the background, into the foreground of the word’s meaning.
Similarly, the recruitment of discourse markers from lexical elements may in-
volve the shifting of backgrounded elements of meaning into the foreground by a
PCI. For example, the imperative of the verb to look and its cross-linguistic con-
geners (French regarde, Italian guarda, etc.) carries the implicature that the object
pointed at is worthy of the listener’s immediate attention (Waltereit 2002). Given
that this is an implicature arising from the meaning of the imperative even out of
context, it may be considered a GCI, more precisely an I-implicature. If speakers
use that imperative without an object to look at, but simply in order to take ad-
vantage of that GCI, they flout Quality, with an attendant PCI. Repeated use of
the imperative look! without something to look at will result in its recruitment to
the class of discourse markers, thereby lexicalizing the former implicature. That
is, the content of the GCI turns into coded content, but, crucially, only by passing
through a PCI stage.
Of course, not everything which is in the background is a GCI. Other back-
grounded aspects of meaning will probably include presuppositions, function words
and grammatical meaning in general.
Summarizing, the evidence discussed so far suggests that three distinct path-
ways of semantic change are possible, with respect to the relation of implicatures
and coded meaning:
i. PCI (→ *GCI)→ coded meaning, as exemplified by the mouse. This might
be the standard case of semantic change.
ii. PCI→ GCI (*→ coded meaning), as exemplified by conventionalized indi-
rectness. Progress to coded meaning is possible only if, on a literal reading,
the item in question would be ungrammatical for independent reasons.
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iii. GCI → PCI → coded meaning, as exemplified by English crawl, German
selbst, and others9.
Two possible objections may now arise with respect to the assumption that GCIs
are generally backgrounded elements of meaning. The first concerns the back-
ground status of GCIs in conventionalized indirectness, the second one the poten-
tial problems raised by M-GCIs.
4.4 Two possible objections
4.4.1 Conventionalized indirectness and background
The first objection one might raise concerns conventionalized indirectness. We
have argued that conventionalized indirectness in indirect speech acts can be cap-
tured as a PCI having turned into a GCI. Now, in indirect speech acts, it is fairly
obvious that the communicative intention associated with that GCI is typically the
central point of the utterance. Thus, in Can you pass the salt? the request inter-
pretation is clearly in the foreground. Hence, conventionalized indirectness is a
counterexample to the generalization that GCIs are in the background of an utter-
ance.
But upon closer inspection this problem is smaller than it appears to be at first
blush. Foreground and background are relative notions, relative to what else is “in
the picture”. At the same time, they are conceived of as perceptually inevitable,
i.e. something must be in the foreground, while something else must be in the
background. It is our contention that, with respect to the cases of conventionalized
9It is tempting to relate our sequences of semantic change to Betty J. Birner’s
(this volume) distinction of forward vs. backward inferences. The sequence GCI
→ PCI→ coded meaning would correspond to a forward inference, inasmuch as
e.g. the step from ‘to move on hands and knees’ to ‘to move slowly’ is an
elaboration or actualization of some piece of meaning already present in the
semantics of to crawl (even though in its background). The sequence PCI→
coded meaning, however, would correspond to a backward inference, since the
link between e.g. the ‘small rodent’ and the ‘computer pointing device’ is not yet
present in the semantic representation of mouse ‘small rodent’. Rather, only after
seeing the computer pointing device named mouse can the hearer establish the
link between the two pieces of meaning. It is therefore possible that Birner’s
distinction of forward vs. backward inferences has at least two applications in
language: A synchronic one in establishing syntagmatic coherence in anaphoric
relations, and a diachronic one in establishing paradigmatic polysemies in
semantic change.
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indirectness at hand, the “literal” meanings involved simply cannot be in the fore-
ground of the message. Take the case of conventionalized indirect requests realized
as yes/no questions: it is clear that, in the vast majority of contexts, the answer to
the literal meaning of a question like Can you pass the salt? will be quite obvi-
ous to both interactants. If the information value of the answer is negligible, the
question will appear redundant, unless given some alternative (request) interpreta-
tion, which will thus move into the foreground. This is supported by the fact that
utterances of the form Can you do X? will, in fact, tend to be interpreted literally,
i.e. not as indirect requests, if the answer to the literal question is not obvious.
Consider, for instance, the most likely interpretations of (44) and (45):10
(44) Could you pick up that pebble from the floor? (→ Please pick up that peb-
ble.)
(45) Could you pick up that huge rock over there?
As for indirect requests of the Do you mind doing X? or Will/would you do X?-
type, the answer to the literal question may not be obvious, but a positive answer
will, however, in a great many cases, be of very little consequence to the person
asking, unless the action denoted by the utterance is, indeed, carried out within
a relevantly short space of time. Again, we may note a contrast in interpretation
between (46) and (47), which suggests that the request GCI is only pushed into the
foreground when the literal meaning is of negligible relevance:
(46) Will you pick up your socks? (→ Do, please, pick up your socks!)
(47) Will you attend John’s funeral?
In other words, if, as in Can you pass the salt?, the utterance consists of the re-
quest alone, then the request interpretation, even though triggered routinely, will
automatically be in the foreground, simply because there is nothing which could
dominate it perceptually. (The literal interpretation is thus in the background rel-
ative to the GCI.) Anything which is usually in the background will shift into the
foreground if nothing else worthwhile is on the scene. However, it seems to us that
the generalization holds that if there is a PCI and a GCI attached to an utterance,
then the PCI will, all other things being equal, be in its foreground relative to the
GCI. For example, the utterance Can you pass the salt could also carry a PCI in a
context like the following, a variation of Grice’s (1975) standard example:
10Note that, if the addressee is in a wheel chair, (44) is much less likely to
automatically receive the request interpretation, since in that situation, the answer
to the literal question is no longer quite so obvious.
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(48) (Two students having lunch in the university cafeteria)
A: Professor X is an old bag.
(Professor X passing by behind A)
B: Can you pass the salt?
The apparent flouting of Relation in B’s utterance, with its attendant PCI, is clearly
in the foreground of the message and supersedes the request interpretation by GCI
(let alone the literal interpretation).
4.4.2 M-GCIs
Levinson’s M-implicatures appear to pose a problem for our generalization, too.
It is fairly clear that a speaker who utters (7) above will typically be intending to
convey, as a central element of meaning, the idea that Max is perhaps not the most
intelligent person s/he can think of. However, the category of M-implicatures is,
in fact, a problematic one in itself. Thus, ?: 546f argues that the principle of non-
synonymy will ensure that marked and unmarked forms have partially different
meanings, and that the M-heuristic is therefore not needed. Indeed, it seems to us
that many of the expression types that Levinson (1995, 2000) classifies as convey-
ing GCIs relying on the M-heuristic, may rather carry the meanings in question as
part of their semantics.
For instance, according to Levinson (1995: 104) the noun residence is marked
with respect to home, and therefore implicates a grander-than-usual home. If this
is a mere implicature, it should, strictly speaking, be possible to apply the word
residence to any kind of home, yet it seems difficult to describe one’s clay hut
as the family residence, except ironically. Similarly, Levinson (1995: 105) states
that a reduplication like ate and ate will implicate that the activity took place on a
larger-than-usual scale, but we doubt whether this putative implicature can actually
be canceled, cf. the infelicity of (49).
(49) ?*Algernon ate and ate, but not very much
As for the double negative construction exemplified in (7), one might argue that,
although logically ~~p is of course equal to p, in natural language, this construc-
tion is not simply a round-about way of making a positive statement, but that its
semantics differs from that of the corresponding plain positive or negative con-
structions, in that the double negative indicates that the state-of-affairs described
is to be seen in terms of contraries rather than contradictories. In other words, per-
haps (7) does not mean that Max is intelligent, and implicate that Max is less than
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a genius. Perhaps what it means is that there is a scale of the form in (50), and that
Max is not located at the bottom of it11.
(50) <unintelligent, of-average-brain-power, intelligent>
Notice that double negatives in other contexts clearly have the effect of reinterpret-
ing what is prototypically thought of as contradictory states-of-affairs as contrary
ones: thus, for instance, if a speaker who knows that Ernest is living with another
man in a marriage-like relationship, but that he wishes to keep this a secret from
all but his closest friends and family, is asked by a female friend who is single and
attracted to Ernest whether the latter is married, s/he might well answer as in (51),
which manifestly does not mean the same thing as (52):
(51) Ernest is not unmarried. . .
(52) Ernest is married.
In other words, it seems that a great many putative M-implicatures may not ac-
tually be implicatures, and that they are, therefore, not counterexamples to our
characterization of GCIs as backgrounded elements of meaning, after all.
Certainly, some of the alleged examples of M-implicatures are really impli-
catures. For example, the difference between (53) and (54) Levinson (2000: 39),
where (53) indicates a stop in the stereotypical manner by use of the foot pedal,
whereas (54) points to an unusual procedure, “e.g. by use of the emergency brake”
(ibid.), does not seem to involve a difference in semantic content but rather in the
licensed implicatures, as the potential cancellation of (54) shows:
(53) Bill stopped the car.
(54) Bill caused the car to stop (– by stepping on the brake.)
Here, however, the oddity of the exchange in (55) seems to indicate that the impli-
cature “unusual stopping procedure” is backgrounded, as a GCI should be:
(55) A. Bill caused the car to stop. (→ Bill stopped the car in an unusual man-
ner.)
B. #Oh. I wonder why he didn’t just step on the brake.
11If this is the correct analysis, then the implicature that Max is less than
positively brilliant may, of course, arise as a scalar Q-implicature.
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Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the reading of (54) as an “unusual stopping
procedure”, while correct, does not yet seem to constitute a full interpretation of
the utterance. Rather, in context, it will normally be necessary to convey how ex-
actly the car was halted, that is, by use of the hand brake, by crashing it against
a wall, etc.12 That is, what is really meant by the utterance (54) is conveyed not
by a context-independent implicature, as a GCI is purported to be, but rather by
context-dependent pragmatic meanings. In other words, it seems that any fore-
grounded implicature attached to (54) will have to be, not a GCI, but a PCI. To
that extent, (53) and (54), while seemingly complementary, are asymmetrical.
More broadly, the very formulation of the M-heuristic reveals an important
difference with respect to the other two heuristics which might point to a poten-
tial flaw. The Q-heuristic “What is not said is not the case” and the I-heuristic
“What is simply described is stereotypically and specifically instantiated” allow
the hearer straightforwardly to find the intended interpretation, via the underlying
scale in the case of Q-GCIs and via encyclopedic knowledge of the stereotype in
the case of I-GCIs. However, this is not so easy with the M-heuristic “A marked
description signals a marked state of affairs”. It does not in itself yield a sufficient
interpretation, given that there are many possible marked states of affairs, even if
one knows what the unmarked state of affairs would be. In fact, in order to narrow
down the range of possibly intended interpretations and to pinpoint the one in-
tended “marked state of affairs”, the hearer must have recourse to situation-specific
knowledge. This in itself is perhaps incompatible with attributing GCI-status to the
implicature in question. It might therefore be that the M-heuristic is not actually
useful for finding generalized conversational implicatures, and that interpretations
allegedly licensed by M-GCIs either match the coded content directly or are par-
tially licensed by Manner PCIs, and that there are no pure M-GCIs at all.
4.5 Interactional factors as a constraint on semanticization
Levinson (1995: 96; 2000: 6) suggests that human communication relies so heavily
on implicatures because of a mismatch in the speed of articulation on the one hand
and the speed of cognition on the other. Humans can articulate speech only much,
much slower than they can process language in the other, non-physical, domains
of production and comprehension. That is, articulation is the bottleneck in the
system, and this favors the use of inferences in order to enhance overall speed,
since inferences are not constrained by that bottleneck.
12The use of “e.g.” in Levinson’s formulation of the implicature is telling in this
respect.
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We would suggest, however, that improving speed is not the only reason for the
heavy use of implicatures, and maybe not even the most important one. As we saw
in sect. 3.1.3. above, Levinson’s (2000: 70) redundancy constraint on lexicalization
suggests that Q-implicatures do not semanticize due to a least-effort principle. Are
there similar constraints on semanticization for the other GCI-types, too?
A great many I-implicatures will inherently resist semanticization, too, but for
other reasons. These implicatures frequently serve purposes of face saving and/or
hedging (i.e. (56), in which the word drink implicates, but crucially does not state
that alcoholic drinks are meant, as the canceling context in (57) shows). Such in-
teractional purposes are only served if the suggested meaning remains implicit, so
this type of implicature will tend not to semanticize, either.
(56) John had a few drinks on his way home from work. (→ John had a few
alcoholic drinks on his way home from work.)
(57) Wait a minute: I want to get a drink of water from the fountain.
Direct requests being face-threatening acts par excellence, similar reasoning can
be applied to explain the non-semanticization of conventionally indirect speech
acts, and also of implicatures such as that in (5), in as much as a merely suffi-
cient condition leaves the hearer more options than a both necessary and sufficient
condition.
M-implicatures, to the extent that they are GCI at all, may obey these sorts of
constraints, too: saying that Bill “caused the car to stop” may, at least on the face
of it, be a good deal more discreet than saying The stupid fool crashed the car into
a tree. Indeed, interactional considerations may play a role in the constraint on
semanticization of even Q-implicatures. Thus, (3) above is obviously more polite
if it merely suggests that not all the students are bright.
That is, implicated meaning is not only conveyed faster than coded meaning.
It is also often interactionally useful to leave it implicated, and, all things being
equal, this puts a brake on semanticization.
5 Conclusion
Our re-examination of the role of particularized vs generalized implicatures in lan-
guage change has shown that the sequence PCI>GCI> coded meaning is, instead
of being the standard case of semantic change, in fact a rare exception. Only if id-
iomatic formulae of conventionalized indirectness become ungrammatical in their
literal reading due to independent changes in the language, does meaning actually
30
travel this sequence. “Run-of-the-mill” semantic changes are more likely to pro-
ceed directly from PCI to coded meaning. And if GCIs do semanticize, they can
do so only as a result of being foregrounded by a PCI13.
Two assumptions have been crucial in our argumentation. First, we have as-
sumed that a GCI is a phenomenon at the semantics-pragmatics interface in its
own right which is not necessarily tied to the transitions related to language change
or its propagation in the speech community. This means that GCIs are not neces-
sarily an intermediate stage in diachronic processes. They can equally well be the
starting point or the endpoint of a language change.
Second, our own alternative model relies heavily on the notions of foreground
vs background. While these gestalt-theoretic terms are not defining properties of
implicatures nor of other semantic / pragmatic phenomena, they are nevertheless
very useful when it comes to modeling the role of pragmatics in semantic change.
Moreover, our argumentation confirmed Traugott’s (2004b) critique of the role of
M-implicatures in language change. Probably, M-implicatures always are, or at
least involve, PCIs.
More remains to be done, however. First, more detailed research into attested
semantic changes, including quantitative research, might provide a firmer basis for
the model proposed here. It remains to be seen whether GCIs, especially other than
the standard ones, are actually a frequency-based phenomenon, as assumed here.
Second, taking into account a broader database will enable us to assess whether
the proposed list of three possible pathways is actually exhaustive. But even if re-
finement should be necessary, it will be clear that GCIs are not simply a transitory
stage in a semantic change.
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